The Distrust of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Regime to the United States of America and its Impact on its Foreign Policy

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Abstract:

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 and its anti-hegemonic and xenophobic aims led to a kind of mistrust and confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. Examining the reasons for Iran's distrust of the United States, as well as the discourses of the foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution, assumes and concludes that the mental background of Iranians and Iranian revolutionaries from the interventions and domination of great powers throughout Iran's history led to an Islamic revolution. Denial of domination and alienation. Subsequently, the Islamic Republic's perception of the hostility of the current domination of the revolution through its goals and approach has led the country to base its foreign policy discourses on the goal due to distrust of US goals and its efforts to change the regime. Plan the regime's survival and focus on security issues and in two perspectives: expediency and idealism.

Keywords: Distrust, Foreign policy, US, Iran.

1. Introduction

Ayatollah Khomeini was very popular among the masses due to his religious background and struggles with the Pahlavi government. He was able to take power by overthrowing the long-standing hatred of the people for foreign colonization and oppression throughout the history of the country and overthrow the Pahlavi government, which was accused of being overthrown by Western countries. Because the revolutionaries considered the Shah to be a very close ally of the West, especially the United States. Feeling threatened by a repeat of the coup of August 19, 1953, the country was seen as seeking the return of the Pahlavi monarchy. Their perception of American actions and their approach to the revolution has always led to their distrust. The distrust has led to verbal confrontations as well as military confrontations over the past four decades.
Using the depth of distrust between the two countries, Emery (2013) inferred that the Iranians believed from the beginning of the revolution that the United States was seeking the overthrow of the emerging Islamic regime, and this has led to a kind of distrust between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. Former British Foreign Secretary Straw (2019) attributed the Iranians' distrust to national sensitivities to powerful countries and their actions, such as the Paris Agreement, the secession of Afghanistan from Iran, the marginalization of the constitution, imposed oil contracts, and support for coups against governments, and ultimately the support for Saddam during the country's war with Iran. One of the former diplomats of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while pointing to this suspicion, pointed out the reasons for the increase in Iran's distrust of the United States as; its disrespect for Iran's identity, interference in internal affairs, attempts to change the regime, harming the government, and finally, the presentation of an evil image of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the international community (Mousavian and Shahidsaless, 2014). But Kissinger (2014), examining the Islamic Republic of Iran's views on world order, believes that the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran founder from the days of the victory of the revolution, the illegitimacy of political institutions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries was due to conflict with divine laws. He considers the distrust of Iran and the United States to each other as natural and adds that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a post-colonial system, seeks the goodwill of the United States. He considers the West's conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran over the nature of world order.

Given the above explanations, this article has tried to introduce another dimension of distrust. The distrust of the leaders of the Islamic Republic towards the United States because of their mental background in the history of Iran.

This article consists of Three sections. First, by presenting some historical examples of the interventions of powerful and influential countries in Iran and their role in overthrowing governments, the cause, and root of the distrust of the leaders of the Islamic Republic are discussed. In the second part, the role and impact of this distrust in the principles of the government of the Islamic Republic are discussed and it is explained how this distrust is crystallized in the constitution, the decisions of the revolutionary leaders, and the foreign policy discourses. In the last part, it is argued that given the differences between the government of the Islamic Republic and the United States of America and the suspicion of the leaders of the Iranian regime about the intentions and actions of this country, Iran's foreign policy discourses to maintain the system and security-oriented framework have taken the form of idealism and expediency.
2. History of Foreign Interference in Iran's Internal Affairs and The Overthrow of Governments

During the reign of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, he was supported by Russia. Opposite him was the constitutional movement, which was favored and supported by Britain. Due to the growing tensions between the totalitarian and constitutionalist Shah, the Shah of Iran ordered the bombing of the National Assembly. In response, the constitutionalists seized the capital, prompting the Shah of Iran to seek refuge in the Russian embassy to protect his life (Shabani, 2005, p. 229-230). This period of history was the scene of the rise of Russia and Britain in Iran, which always put political and military pressure on the political governments of Iran. The other case took place during the reign of Ahmad Shah Qajar and after the relative reduction of Russian influence in Iran and led to the British attempt to conclude a treaty called 1919, which the Iranian government signed under its full influence. Mohammad Mossadegh later declared in connection with this interventionist and coercive action: "When the Shah refused to name and recognize the 1919 agreement in London, he was told that if he resisted, he would be deposed" (Keyostovan, 1948, p. 31-34).

Despite British support for Reza Shah Pahlavi during his rise to power, the Shah of Iran disagreed with the country over the Darcy oil deal (Afkhami, 2009, p. 35-37). As some disputes between the two governments continued, the outbreak of World War II and the close ties between Germany and Iran led Britain to use the Soviet Union to occupy Iran. Thus, under political and military pressure, Reza Shah decided to abdicate and replace the Crown Prince (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 203). After the overthrow of Reza Shah, British influence due to the occupation of Iran was so great that they decided to negotiate with a Qajar prince in London to return to Iran and revive the Qajar dynasty. (Wright, 1977, p. 399-400).

The coup against the popular cabinet of Mohammad Mossadegh was another obvious interference of the great powers in the Iranian political scene. During the nationalization of the oil industry and the conflict between Iran and Britain, the Truman government called on both countries to resolve this conflict peacefully (Raether and Sampson, 1989, p. 61). Because it was possible that with the cessation of Iran's oil revenues, the economy, and subsequently the Iranian government would collapse (Gasiorowski and Byrne, 2004, p. 198). Truman also opposed the British government's coercive proposals, arguing that such actions would destabilize Iran and trap communism (Kinzer, 2003, p. 145-146). The plan to overthrow Mossadegh's government was eventually proposed by the British to the Republican government of Eisenhower and was approved (Blum, 1995, p. 64-65). The US Secretary of State Dallas also saw the coup as the only way to get rid of a lunatic like Mossadegh (Roosevelt, 1979, p. 8). Finally, the coup was successful on August 19, 1953, with the arrest and deportation of Mohammad Mossadegh, the Shah, who failed due to the failed coup plot was abroad, returning to Iran.
victoriously, expressing happiness at the interest of the Iranian people in himself (Thomas, 1996, p. 109).

There are also hypotheses about the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi from the government regarding foreign interference. As the Democratic government of Jimmy Carter came to power, the pressure on the Pahlavi government increased with slogans based on morality, the revival of American values, and greater attention to human rights, which was a return of Wilson's approach to foreign policy (Hancock, 2007, p. 32-34). General Qarani, a commander in the Imperial Army who was also close to the revolutionaries, wrote in a letter to George Lambrakis, head of the US embassy in Iran, that Khomeini's supporters knew that President Carter's human rights policy had facilitated the overthrow of the Shah (Fattahi, 3rd June 2016). On the other hand, according to then-Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Khosrow Afshar, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance admitted in a meeting that meetings had taken place between US officials and opponents of the imperial regime (Cooper, 2016, p. 397).

Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Carter sent General Heizer to this country. His goal was to call on the military to calm down and give a civilian and moderate cabinet a chance to reform (Trenta, 2013, p. 490). He repeatedly told the army leaders that the Shah should leave the country and that the army should refrain from any violent acts such as coups (Cooper, 11th February 2015). Also, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, US officials met with Ayatollah Khomeini's relatives in Tehran and in Neauphle-le-chateau of France, where the Ayatollah's residence was located. One of these messages was sent two days after the Shah's departure, on January 18, 1979, and US officials sent a message to Ayatollah Khomeini that the United States' position on the type of government in Iran would be flexible (Fattahi, 9th June 2016).

The mentioned influences and interventions have always faced the lives of the Iranian people with political crises, numerous poverty and famines, and chaos. These actions have created two forms of distrust and xenophobia in the minds of Iranians. The first form that Ayatollah Khomeini was able to make the most of in his struggle against the Pahlavi regime is the distrust of Iranian society towards powerful countries, of which the United States is one of its victims. This country, which was able to do so through effective support for Iran gained the trust of Iranians during its occupation in World War II. By overthrowing Mossadegh's government during a military coup, in the eyes of Iranians, it was included in the list of hegemonic and colonial countries. Another form of this distrust can be seen within the government. The coup of 1953 and the confession of US officials to it, caused the nascent regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran to always have a mental obstacle to the efforts of the United States of America to overthrow political regimes that are against the interests of this country. On the other hand, the meeting of US officials with Ayatollah Khomeini's relatives and the correspondence of
the then US President Carter with him personally created the impression that US officials would not be trusted and relied even on their close allies if their interests required it.

3. Discourses and logic of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Historical distrust has led to the denial of domination and independence as the only solution to prevent foreign influence and intervention, and ultimately the overthrow of the government. Due to this issue, discourses were formed in Iran's foreign policy based on the security and survival of the government. The government of the Islamic Republic believes that the anti-hegemonic nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran has made them arrogant and exploitative current hostile to it. Thus, this government seeks a kind of deterrence against the countries that it calls the current of domination and threatens the security of the regime. This deterrence and its tools have been formed at the regional and international levels in the form of offensive and defensive policies, as the time requires. The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, intending to cut off the influence of other countries, have always spoken about the issue of independence and mutual respect and have emphasized the national slogan of Iran after the end of the monarchy, i.e. independence, freedom, and the Islamic Republic. They believe that one of the reasons for the revolution against the Pahlavi regime was his service to Western countries and moving in their interests. Ayatollah Khomeini, the first leader of the Islamic Revolution, declares: "We will treat all nations with respect if they do not interfere in our internal affairs and have mutual respect for us (Mousavi Khomeini, 2008, p. 38). Also, Ayatollah Khamenei, the second leader of the Islamic Revolution, has referred to this issue "We want to have a relationship with all nations," he said. "Even we have no enmity with the American people, so our main problem is the US government and its arrogant goals that we are fighting against" (Khamenei, 10th September 2009). The denial of political domination and independence also has a significant role in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 153 of the Constitution, which deals with the denial of domination, states: "Any contract that causes foreign domination of the natural and economic resources, culture, army and other affairs of the country will be prohibited".

The impact of the security and survival of the Islamic Republic on the national interests of Iran is very great. At the forefront of national interests are the existential interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which aims to maintain the existence of the Islamic system through the establishment of national security, sovereignty, and defense of independence. Ayatollah Khomeini also considers the preservation of the Islamic system as an obligation and a kind of divine duty for all (Mousavi Khomeini, 2008, p. 220). The other category is important interests, which include ideological issues, issues related to the international system, and economic issues. Given that the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a realistic approach, has always considered the issue of security as its highest policy, it seems that any
category of interests will be redefined with a security-oriented approach and with the impact of existential interests. "For example, after the Iran-Iraq war and the need to modernize the country and rebuild the economy, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then president, declared that it was economic and social issues that threatened the survival of the system" (Rafsanjani, 2003, p. 27-30).

Based on the mentioned interests, during the life of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there have been different foreign policy discourses. Although some of these strategies have different approaches to domestic and international issues, all of them have put the frameworks, the red lines of the leaders, and the existential interests of the Islamic Republic on their top priority. The first round of the discourse of realism in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran was formed during the interim government of the Prime Minister of Bazargan. This discourse recognizes the existing international order and its rules and seeks to transform the new government as an established player in the international system. The interim government believed that Iran's need for US technology was urgent and that relations with that country were essential. Therefore, by choosing a non-aligned approach, it tried to establish relations with all countries of the world, including the United States.

During this period, US foreign policy was to prevent Soviet influence in the region, as well as to establish relations with moderate elements in Iran to restore stability to the Middle East. (Ambrose, 1971, p. 275-284). Because the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan had made the influence of communism and its supporters in Iran, such as the Tudeh Party, and was dangerous to US interests, the Carter government avoided any action that would weaken Iran's moderate, liberal interim government (Dumbrell, 1996, p. 36). But the publication of the 1952 coup in Iran by Kermit Roosevelt and the revelation of the role of the United States and the West in it, as well as the Shah's triumphant return to the country, increased the distrust of the revolutionaries in this country. Also, the presence and movement of US Army ships raised concerns (Ramezani, 2009, p. 40). Ultimately, it was President Carter's permission for the Shah to enter the country that fueled this distrust. The Shah's visit to the United States was for medical treatment and on the advice of physicians (Kaufman, 2006, p. 77). But the revolutionaries, fearing that the Shah would return to power with US support, took precautionary and aggressive measures, occupying the US embassy and taking a number of its staff hostage (Mousavian and Shahidsaless, 2014, p. 61-62). However, Gary Sick believes that the Shah's arrival in the United States was merely an excuse to carry out a preemptive plan to attack the embassy and that Ayatollah Khomeini was already aware of this decision (Sick, 1985, p. 197).

Simultaneously with the crisis, there were two proposals in the US government for diplomatic action by the Secretary of State and harsh military action by the National Security Adviser, which eventually, due to the resignation of the interim government in Iran and the possibility of a failed negotiation, a military strike to free the hostages was approved by President Carter (Houghton, 2001,
Eventually, a military operation called the Eagle's Claw was unsuccessful, forcing American troops to leave Iran (Martin, 2017, p. 493). This military operation fueled distrust, and Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the crisis of hostage-taking and arrest of spies by students is due to the damage that the United States has inflicted on the Iranian nation, and the guarantee of non-political and military intervention by the United States and the release of Iranian blocked funds in this country is a condition for resolving this issue (Mousavi Khomeini, 2008, p. 84). He considered the handover of the Shah to Iran as one of the main conditions for establishing relations between Iran and the United States and allowed the Liberal Provisional Government to consolidate the position of the government of the Islamic Republic in the international community, to provide the ground for the revolutionaries to gain confidence in the intentions of the United States. With the failure of the interim government to seize this opportunity and the perception of hostile actions by the United States against Iran, extremist elements in Iran gained more power and influence, and their distrust of the United States remained.

4. The Beginning of The Discourse Cycle in Iran's Foreign Policy in The Face of US Policies

Value-oriented or idealistic discourse is another foreign policy discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran that is based on the original ideals of the revolution and Islamic norms (Lolaki, 2020, p. 200). This discourse is derived from the principles of the denial of domination and is designed to change the existing condition in the international system.

In the early years of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the most important goals of US foreign policy, as in previous decades, were the security of Israel, the preservation of oil interests, and the prevention of Soviet influence in the Middle East (Edwards, 2014: 17-18). Thus, the United States was committed to maintaining the flow of Middle Eastern oil in the western part of the Iron Curtain (Yergin, 2009, p. 409). Such a goal made stability in Iran very important. Realizing these sensitivities and goals, there was a kind of containment in President Reagan's foreign policy against Iran and the Soviet Union (Miles and Sabet, 30th October 2018). He believed that both regimes were unstable and that dialogue, along with military pressure, would affect them. But the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war led the revolutionaries to see Saddam and the United States as aiming to overthrow the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Razoux and Elliott, 2013, p. 68-69). Ayatollah Khomeini in a message accused Saddam of inciting and supporting the US agent and the US government (Khomeini, 2000, p. 221-222) Nearly three years after the war, Iran was able to advance on Iraqi soil by liberating most of its occupied territories. Because Iran was considered a greater threat because of its larger population and the radical ideology of its regime, the United States decided to support Saddam to repel its attacks and re-establish a balance of power in the region (Kissinger, 2002, p. 318).
This led leaders and extremists inside Iran to adopt an aggressive and destructive foreign policy in response to US actions by creating an idealistic discourse, replacing the revolutionary and idealistic non-alignment with the interim government's unrealistic non-alignment. During the rule of this discourse in the field of the foreign policy of Iran, this country considered international organizations under the influence of superpowers. Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq war, according to the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council, believed that any organization in which the great powers are members has been created to satisfy their interests. He considered the Security Council, the veto power of its permanent members, and other international organizations as a tool of abuse and playfulness of the powers (Khomeini, 2000, p. 190). In addition to these measures, the Islamic regime, by adopting idealistic policies, sought to create ideological insecurities for other countries, change the state-centered Westphalian order and turn it into a nation-centered order. The policy of exporting the revolution was an example of these efforts and aimed at penetrating the minds of the Muslim nation, which caused concern among the countries bordering the Persian Gulf (U.S. Senate, 4th March 1980).

In general, US policies during the Iran-Iraq war led Iran to view its actions, such as political and military support for Saddam, economic sanctions, and then a confrontation with Iran, as hostile and targeted to overthrow the revolutionary government of Iran (Tarock, 1998, p. 67-69). In response, the Iranian leaders' distrust has manifested itself in an aggressive and idealistic discourse, leading to countermeasures such as the policy of exporting the revolution, trying to develop and influence the Shiite ideological vision in the region, and supporting jihadist militant groups in Lebanon and Palestine, hostage-taking and bombing in Beirut killed 241 American Marines and 58 French peacekeepers (Berman, 2007, p. 7-8).

President Reagan's policies in the early years of the war, in addition to emphasizing a containment strategy against the Soviets and Iran, were also important in maintaining the traditional balance of power between Iran and Iraq in the region (Shareef, 2014, p. 8-10). As in the Iran-Contra affair, it decided to sell arms to Lebanon to mediate Iran in the release of American hostages. He also, with a tolerant approach, ordered the withdrawal of American troops from Beirut after the bombing in Beirut, despite France's readiness to bomb Hezbollah's positions (Allin and Simon, 2010, p. 31). Evaluating the performance and decisions of the US government, Iranian idealists concluded that the creation of a deterrent, such as hostage-taking and proxy measures, would cause Americans who were unwilling to endure human suffering and casualties without a valid and vital purpose to flee the region (Pollack, 2004, p. 275). But the continuation of the war and Iran's attack on US-backed Kuwaiti oil tankers turned the Reagan administration's policy of dialogue and military pressure into a military confrontation between Iran and the United States (Fayazmanesh, 2008, p.38-40). The discourse of idealism in Iranian foreign policy was a response to the regime's understanding of the hostile actions
of the United States. In the last years of the war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran showed that maintaining the revolution and the Islamic government would be a top priority. Feeling insecure at this level disrupts the rules of the game at the international level and creates insecurity for others (Davis et al., 2011, p. 31-32). Ali Akbar Velayati, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed that the Islamic State was not only obliged to work to change the foundations of oppressive powers and oppressive global relations, but also to provide the real and vital security desired by this change (Velayati, 1986, p. 3).

After the end of the war, with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the beginning of the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran was going through difficult days. The war reportedly cost the country a total of nearly $648 billion (Katouzian, 2013, p. 212-214). The damage caused by the war has led to high unemployment and inflation for this country (Mofid, 1990, p. 138-140). Thus, as economic and social issues became a security challenge in this period, the need for economic reconstruction was felt. This period led to the emergence of pragmatic or expedient discourse in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this discourse, the Islamic Republic of Iran is considered the most important place in the Islamic world and considering the centrality and leadership of the Iranian regime in the Islamic world, maintaining it in any possible way, even in the existing international order, was a kind of expediency and obligation.

With the beginning of the Bush government as President of the United States, and with the fall of the Soviet Union and the crisis in China, he, like President Reagan, sought a policy of restraint and dialogue with Iran (Wright, 2011, p. 210-211). In 1989, he declared that "good faith creates good faith" and called on President Hashemi Rafsanjani to mediate the release of American hostages held by Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran, which had lost its balance with the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system, decided to defuse tensions with that country. But despite Iran's cooperation and the release of the hostages by Hezbollah, no reciprocal good faith was shown by the United States (Mousavian, p. 2012). Thus, Iran's distrust of the United States increased once again.

Following the period of expediency in Iran and during the presidency of Bill Clinton in the United States, a policy of dual restraint was implemented by his administration in response to the weakness of the traditional system of balance of power. To the extent that the two countries of Iraq and Iran were identified as the biggest obstacles to peace in the Middle East and were controlled simultaneously (Yetiv, 2008, p. 104-105). Because the emergence of either of these two countries as an absolute power would jeopardize the regional order and vital interests of the United States (Yetiv, 1995, p. 154). According to this policy, Iraq with intense pressure and Iran with a stick and carrot policy encouraged against their good faith and threatened and punished for their hostile behavior. Besides, the revelation
of Republican Sen. Greengridge’s 18 million Dollars plan in the US Congress to put more pressure on Iran led the Islamic Republic of Iran to argue with clearer reasons that the US intention is still to overthrow the regime (Scott, 1998, p. 113).

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the pragmatic president of Iran, who was still working to rebuild Iran's economy, decided to improve Iran's relationship with the European Union and start critical talks (Mousavian, 2008, p. 194-197). He has also made the same effort with the United States, seeking a 1 billion Dollars contract with the US oil company of Konoko (Litwak, 2000, p. 181-182). This action which is still known among Iranian hardliners as the "Rafsanjani olive branch to the United States," was rejected by Clinton. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran did not see the expected good faith on the party of the United States, it once again took an aggressive behavior. This time, conservative extremists in Iran believed that the country would need a better deterrent to the United States and its actions. With these interpretations, the expansion of proxy wars could be a good idea because the United States had shown in connection with the bombing of Lebanon that it would not tolerate many casualties. Thus, the offensive measures once again dominated the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Naval exercises in the Persian Gulf, operations by pro-Islamic Republic movements in the region, terrorist operations at the Mykonos restaurant in Germany, the bombing of a Jewish center in Amia, Argentina, and finally the bombing of good towers in Saudi Arabia are examples of these reciprocal measures (Bergman, 2008, p. 115-155).

During the presidency of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, another expedient discourse called reformism prevailed in the country's foreign policy. The purpose of this discourse was to create a civil society, gain public consent, followed by legitimacy at home and de-escalation abroad. This moderate foreign policy was necessary for a view of the regional and global crises at the beginning of the 21st century, as Hassan Rouhani, the then Secretary of the National Security Council, later stated that the foreign policy of the Khatami government caused that despite the existence of threats and the inclusion of Iran in the blacklist of the international community, the country to overcome the risk of war (Rouhani, 7th June 2013). President Khatami by pursuing a policy of detente in an interview with CNN in 1998 celebrated the greatness of the American people and the goals of its founders. He also endorsed Ayatollah Khomeini’s independence and pro-Western actions, calling the decision of the Congress to overthrow the regime in Iran humiliating, referring to the $ 20 million budget of the Congress (Khatami, 7th January 1998). The US response was also with well faith, and the Secretary of State praised Iran and acknowledged US involvement in the 1952 coup, trying to defuse tensions and break down the wall of distrust (Balaghi, 2013, p. 73-74). Eventually, however, the US government sent a secret letter to the Iranian government through the Sultan of Oman stating that the United States, citing sufficient evidence, had implicated Iran in the bombing of the Khobar Towers and called for their trial. After a
relatively long silence, the Khatami government called the US accusations wrong and baseless (Indyk, 2009, p. 225-226). Eventually, as the dispute continued, trust-building measures between the two countries failed, and US preconditions for negotiating with Iran on Iran's missile issue, Israel, and support for terrorism were not accepted by Iran leader (Keddie and Richard, 2006, p. 272).

With the beginning of the Bush presidency and after 2001 9/11, Iran cooperated with the United States in invading Afghanistan (Associated Press, 24th November 2013). Because the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan for years, posed a security threat to Iran because of ideological differences and the possibility of cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as existing tensions (Milani, 2010, p. 2-4). But despite Tehran's cooperation and the creation of hope for cooperation between the two countries at the regional level, Bush, in a speech, placed Iran alongside North Korea and Iraq on the axis of evil (Parsi, 2007, p. 228-237). Following the not-so-difficult fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 posed two new problems concerning Iran. First, it allowed the Islamic Republic of Iran to add to its strategic depth for its offensive behavior as the Shiite current in Iraq gained power, which could help Iran in its deterrent policy and increase the power of proxy wars of this country (Badie, 2017, p. 77-82). On the other hand, it undermined the policy of containment between Iraq and Iran and made the continued US presence in the region vital (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008, p. 281). But in the end, the US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq was a threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The US presence in the region made the regime of the Islamic Republic feel that in the event of a miscalculation in its behavior, it would face an operation such as the Desert Storm that happened to Saddam in 1990.

The US presence in the region required the now-more suspicious Iranian regime to have a better deterrent to regional action and proxy wars. Disclosure of the dimensions of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program in 2003 and the creation of an international conundrum, even if a nuclear bomb were not achieved, could provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with the time and ability to negotiate and bargain. From the US point of view, this program could disrupt the regional order, endanger the existence of Israel, and create a kind of deterrent between the United States and Iran if it leads to the construction of an atomic bomb (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010, p. 33-35). Thus, negotiations between European countries and The Islamic Republic of Iran were formed and led to the Paris Agreement in 2004 with the acceptance of the conditional suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran. It is worth mentioning that this agreement also failed due to inefficiency and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which intended to gain concessions with its new leverage, failed in this regard. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, once again declared with revolutionary literature that could indicate the emergence of another wave of idealism in Iranian foreign policy that if the Westerners want to continue
this process of continuous demand, I will enter the field as my servant. Negotiations and the resulting agreement failed, and Iran's case went to the Security Council after much wrangling.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which had exposed the hostile policy of the United States against itself, once again put the discourse of idealism at the top of its foreign policy, citing Ayatollah Khamenei's view, the United States's bad intentions towards the revolution. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the president of Iran in 2005. In his speech, he criticized the existing international system and spoke about a kind of international system based on justice and the end of the American order. The foreign policy of Ahmadinejad's government was, in fact, to introduce the Islamic Republic of Iran as a pleasant Islamic government for all Muslims and to present a nation-centered model instead of the center-oriented model of expediencies inside Iran. Continuing his foreign policy approach, he questioned 9/11 as an excuse for the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Attending a conference called "The World Without Zionism," he confirmed Ayatollah Khomeini's remarks about removing Israel from the world map, calling the Holocaust a fake (The Jerusalem Post, 26th October 2005). Ahmadinejad, who was trying to reassert a deconstructive view of the idealist movement in Iran, declared in 2008 that the United States was in decline due to the US economic crisis and that the future rulers of the country would be better to limit their interference to their borders (Jacobson, 23rd September 2008). In other measures, he caused international tensions by traveling to Abu Musa, the disputed island of Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Lebanon (Sherrill, 2018, p. 186).

During Ahmadinejad's presidency, Iran's nuclear program became a major conundrum. From 2006 to 2010, a total of eight resolutions against Iran were approved by the Security Council, and the country's nuclear case was referred to the Security Council by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The crisis created by Iran seems to have been a response to the US disregard for an opportunity called the moderate government during the 2002-2006 negotiations. Now it was the Islamic Republic of Iran that decided to show again the second image of its foreign policy, that is, the threat and use of sensitizing and threatening levers against the existing international order.

Barack Obama, who took over the presidency in 2008, has repeatedly tried to prove to Iran that he does not seek regime change. He declared in Moscow in 2009 that "regime change and the introduction of a regime desired by the United States anywhere in the world is not worthy of the United States." Besides, in a 2009 Nowruz message called "A New Beginning," he called on Iran's leaders to accept Iran's international responsibilities and gain Iran's rightful place in the international community. During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, although he always spoke of readiness for negotiations and even held talks with US officials in Oman, in the end, no agreement was reached between the two countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran seems to have sought to prove once again that
if the US government does not use the opportunity to take the power of the moderate current in Iran, it will have to work harder in the face of a powerful conservative current.

Due to increasing pressure from the international community and, conversely, the demonstration of the value of using an opportunity called moderation by the idealists, the situation once again developed in such a way as to escape the economic pressures of sanctions and reduce the risk of a military attack on Iran. According to Chapter 7 of the Security Council, a moderate current will reach a power. Hassan Rouhani became the President of Iran in 2013 with the slogan of constructive interaction with the West. On the other hand, President Obama's policy toward Iran was to restrain the country by using intelligent power and to offer mutual goodwill (Fayazmanesh, 2013, p. 114). Thus, Iran and the 5 + 1 countries, after several rounds of negotiations, finally signed a multilateral agreement in 2015 called JCPOA, which ultimately provided Iran with enrichment in a controlled percent and instead of its international sanctions against the country were removed. This agreement will allow the removal of arms sanctions against Iran from 2020 and the country will be able to buy weapons. Such an action could be a victory for the Islamic Republic of Iran. With the removal of economic and military sanctions, Iran can become much stronger than before. Such an agreement was a victory for Iran's expedient foreign policy because it was able to remove sanctions threatening Iran's security. However, the Iranian leader continued to show distrust of the United States and, while rejecting the possibility of its relationship with the United States, stressed that Iran was still aware of the evil intentions of the United States (Erdbrink, 21st October 2015).

Finally, in 2016, Donald Trump from the Republican Party became the President of the United States of America. He believed that the JCPOA agreement, ignoring many US interests, would not only give Iran a chance to become one of the richest and most powerful countries in the Persian Gulf with the help of Russia but also make Iran a regional power and could endanger regional order and US allies (Trump, 2016, p. 11). Trump finally pulled out of the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018. The policy of maximum pressure is one of President Trump's strategies for simultaneously resolving Iran's nuclear crisis and its regional actions. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has stated that the goal of the maximum policy is to deprive the Iranian regime of financial resources to support its proxy groups in the region and to force Iranian leaders to negotiate a comprehensive and lasting agreement (Pompeo, 6th August 2019). This policy in 2019 increased the economic pressure on Iran to the highest level in the history of sanctions. Despite declining foreign exchange earnings, Iran's commitments to its proxy groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, remain. However, the Trump government believes that the pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran has always led this regime is willing to be conceded so that the Carter government's economic and political pressure on the release of hostages and the military pressure of the Reagan government at the end of the Iran-Iraq war
moderated Iran's tough positions (Takeyh, 2010, p. 380-382). But this time the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have adopted the policy of maximum resistance against the policy of maximum pressure (Daou, 8th November 2019). The Leader of the Revolution, who has always believed that American concessions are boundless, responded to Trump's threat to tear down the agreement by declaring that if the US President's threat to tear down the JCPOA was implemented, the Islamic Republic would set fire to the JCPOA (Tehran Times, 15th June 2016).

President Trump is talking about a comprehensive and good agreement with Iran. The agreement covers the issue of Iran's ballistic missiles, its nuclear program, Iranian-backed proxy groups, and peace in the Middle East. He believes that the strategy of maximum pressure will be only to change the behavior of the Iranian regime. On the other hand, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, while forbidding renegotiation, considers Iran's missile and military programs as the regime's red line. Iranian leaders see the US goal of sanctions as creating unrest in Iran, as shortages and problems caused by sanctions tripled fuel prices in Iran in 2019, leading to a series of popular and anti-government protests across Iran, and put the government in a position to crack down on protesters once again. This time, President Trump, while criticizing President Obama's approach to the Iranian protests in 2009, has stated in support of the Iranian people that he supports the protests the rights of the Iranian people and deems them worthy of a better future (Semones and Toosi, 1st November 2020). This action has put more pressure on the Iranian regime, as US support for the Iranian people, who often disagree with the Iranian regime and are somewhat frustrated with its liberation, could be a glimmer of hope for the Iranian people and stimulate and excite them (Pollack, 2004, p. 506-507). Moreover, such an action could be a similar response to the behavior of the country's idealists, who target nations instead of governments.

Some critics of the Trump government see the policy of maximum pressure as different, more inefficient, and more dangerous than the policies of previous US governments in dealing with Iran. They believe that the economic and political pressures of previous governments have been accompanied by a diplomatic breathing space (Wallsh, 12th February 2020). Despite announcing the existence of military options, the Obama government sought to introduce more realistic and accessible diplomatic solutions to Iran. But now the Trump government has set out 12 preconditions for starting negotiations with Iran, which the Iranian regime seems unwilling to accept. The preconditions that Ayatollah Khamenei considers worthless and the only condition for the start of negotiations is the return of the United States to the JCPOA agreement. On the other hand, according to critics of this policy, the lack of a diplomatic exit that can be examined by Iran has caused the Islamic Republic of Iran to resort to more violent acts in the region than before. Also, the policies of maximum pressure have put the moderates and the Rouhani government under pressure from domestic extremists.
But this time, unlike other US governments throughout the history of confrontation with Iran, the Trump government's tough policies and military readiness have made it difficult for idealism to return to the recurring cycle of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. The United States has warned the Islamic Republic of Iran and its affiliated groups that any action against the country and its interests will be met with a swift and decisive response. As a result of the Trump government's policy of maximum pressure, it put the Revolutionary Guards on the list of terrorist groups. These conflicts culminated in the assassination of General Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, which was the mainstay of Iran's regional actions, and created a serious balance of fear in relations between the two countries. As tensions escalated, President Trump, who had ordered the assassination of Soleimani following the killing of an American in Iraq, officially announced that this would be their official end if Iran wished to go to war.

On the other side of these confrontations, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also shown that it will be fully prepared to confront the United States of America by taking positions and actions. In 2019, a US spy drone was hit and shot down by IRGC missiles in Persian Gulf waters. The IRGC also fired several missiles at a US base in Baghdad in response to General Soleimani's death. Finally, amid these fireworks, the Ukrainian International passenger plane was targeted by the IRGC defensive missile, which resulted in the tragic death of all its passengers and crew. Although Iran stated that the reason was human error, this action shows the understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the threat and readiness for reciprocal action.

As tensions between Iran and the United States escalate, especially concerning recent events, Islamic Republic officials have increasingly questioned US arguments that Iran has violated the spirit of the agreement, as well as its withdrawal from the JCPOA, and they are accused of trying to change the regime in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei believes that all US presidents, even President Obama, who sought to negotiate, are not committed and will not live up to their commitments. He believes this is in response to people asking why Iran is not negotiating with the United States. He believes that the depth of the US hostility and enmity with Iran is very great, and this hostility will not be limited to the nuclear issue. He believes that the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its flagship in the Islamic world cause the US enmity with the system of the Islamic Republic and the attempt to overthrow it.

The foreign policy discourses of the Islamic Republic of Iran appear to be a recurring cycle, depending on the country's perception of the severity of US threats. A cycle of moderate discourse aimed at de-escalating and testing the possibility of trust in the United States, which, if not trusted, would become a deconstructive and aggressive discourse. Dr. Ziba Kalam, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran, said in an interview with Iranian officials during the subsequent sabotage of extremists in the negotiation process in 2015 and beyond that, that the time would come.
when Iranian officials would follow in the footsteps of John Kerry and Obama (Zibakalam, 10th November 2016). Examining the foreign policy discourses of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it seems that it is the Iranian regime that by adopting an idealistic, destructive, and aggressive foreign policy, which is difficult to negotiate and agree has constantly trying to force the United States to seek a moderate current in Iran. Due to the severe distrust in the relations between the two countries, the Islamic Republic can only be assured of its survival if it achieves a strong and powerful deterrent. Some argue that the Islamic Republic of Iran needs deterrence because of the constant sense of threat to its survival and that the United States should either allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon or overthrow its government. Kenneth Waltz believes that nuclear Iran will use this deterrent weapon to ensure its security and not to attack its neighbors and others (Waltz, 2012, p. 2-5).

5. Conclusion

The mental background of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the interference of powerful countries in the internal affairs of their country throughout history has caused the slogans and ideals of the revolution, the constitution and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on independence, denial of domination and aliens. Because Iranian leaders believe that the 1979 Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah as an ally of the United States and cut off Iran from the United States, the United States has always sought regime change and overthrow. They believe that the arrogant nature of the United States requires it to have a relationship with Iran and all other countries and, if necessary, to overthrow the governments based in those countries. These thoughts and goals have greatly influenced the foreign policy discourses of the Islamic Republic of Iran and have caused many of the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be redefined based on security due to the constant threat to the existence of the system. The goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to create a kind of deterrent against the United States of America, and this country has tried to create and implement it using its foreign policy tools at the regional and international levels. A lever that none of the overthrown governments of Iran have had in history or have been overthrown before they were reached. Examining the cycle of discourse in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is inferred that these discourses have been at least in practice a repetitive cycle between expediency and idealism based on the times need. Examining the history of relations between the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, it seems that there is a direct relationship between US actions, the Iranian regime's perception of hostility or non-hostility, and coercive or peaceful reciprocal actions by this regime. Although the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its different discourses has shown that it can change in appearance depending on the circumstances, but it will not deviate from its original. Whatever the discourse, its purpose will be to preserve the center of the Islamic world.
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